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Former Civil Code Section 3369: A Study in Judicial
Interpretation
By WESLEY J. HOWARD*
Introduction
Section 3369 of the California Civil Code' provides California
lawyers with a powerful consumer protection tool. Unfortunately,
most attorneys are unaware of its utility, although the statute has been
available to public and private attorneys in substantially the same form
since the legislature amended the original 1872 wording in 1933 to
read:
1. Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to enforce a
penalty or forfeiture in any case, nor to enforce a penal law, except in
a case of nuisance or unfair competition.
2. Any person performing or proposing to perform an act of unfair
competition within this state may be enjoined in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.
3. As used in this section, unfair competition shall mean and in-
clude (unlawful) unfair or fraudulent business practice and unfair,
untrue, (deceptive) or misleading advertising and any act denounced
by Penal Code Sections 654a, b, or c.
4. As used in this section, the term "person!' shall mean and include
natural persons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock compa-
nies, associations and other organizations of persons.
5. Actions for injunctions under this section may be prosecuted by
the Attorney General or any district attorney in the name of the peo-
ple of the State of California upon their own complaint or upon the
complaint of any board, officer, person, corporation, or association
or by any person acting for the interests of itself, its members, or the
* A.B., 1976, University of California at Berkeley. Member, Third Year Class.
The author would like to gratefully acknowledge and thank the following for making
this Note possible: the Alameda County District Attorney's Consumer Fraud Division, espe-
cially Deputy District Attorney Harry B. Johnson; the Riverside County District Attorney's
Consumer Fraud Division; the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Consumer and Envi-
ronment Protection Division; Deputy Attorney General John Porter, and Professors Roger
Traynor and James R. McCalL
1. Former CAL. Civ. CODE § 3369 (currently codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§
17200-17205 (West Supp. 1978) (as amended 1977). See text accompanying note 138 infra.
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general public.2
This Note will analyze the development of section 3369, as it grew
from a narrow injunctive remedy to a broad tool able to redress a wide
variety of consumer abuse. The historical development graphically il-
lustrates the effect of changing social policy on a "static" entity, that is,
the wording of the statute. The history also shows the great power
available to lawyers, independent of the legislature, to produce signifi-
cant changes in the law. The Note begins with a discussion of the 1933-
62 period during which section 3369 was used primarily as a basis for
an action against secondary name infringement,3 then discusses the
case of People v. National Research Co. ,4 which changed attitudes to-
wards the potential use of section 3369. Finally, the Note analyzes the
cases following National Research and suggests possible future use of
the versatile statute.
The 1933 Amendment and Early Development
The 1933 amendment to section 3369 essentially rewrote the stat-
ute.5 First, the amended statute provided injunctive relief from unfair
competition (in addition to nuisance), and defined "unfair competi-
tion" in section 3369(3) to include "unfair or fraudulent business prac-
tice," as well as false advertising. This definition should be recognized
by modem consumer attorneys as a parallel to the language of section
5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 6 This analogy was not
drawn, however, until nearly thirty years later,7 when social and politi-
cal conditions had changed to accommodate such a viewpoint.
Second, the 1933 amendment expressly provided in section 3369(5)
for injunctive action by the attorney general, district attorney, and pri-
vate individuals. Finally, it defined "person" very broadly in section
3369(4) in reference to both potential plaintiffs and defendants so as to
2. Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 953, § I, at 2482, as amended by Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 1606, § 1, at
3184 (parenthetical words added 1963).
3. The statute also continued to be used for its statement of property law, as it is to
this day. See, e.g., Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949); United Say. & Loan
v. Reeder Development Co., 57 Cal. App. 3d 282, 129 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1976). The principle
involved in these cases is beyond the scope of this Note.
4. 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
5. The 1872 enactment read. "Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to
enforce a penal law, except in a case of nuisance, nor to enforce a penalty or forfeiture in
any case." This relatively innocuous principle of property law was derived from § 1883 of
the New York Field Code, and has itself been the subject of much litigation over the years.
See note 3 supra.
6. "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(1976).
7. People v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 773, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521
(1962). See text accompanying notes 52-77 infra.
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include virtually any combination of persons. Again, many years
passed before attorneys for consumers began to take advantage of the
broadened scope of the amended statute.8
Throughout this early period, section 3369 was used as a statutory
basis for redressing a particular type of common-law tort, secondary
name infringement.9 The statute provided injunctive relief for the
fraudulent use of a trade name which had developed a secondary
meaning, that is, a positive association in the mind of the public be-
tween the name and product or service being offered for sale. The use
of section 3369 was narrowly limited to cases where, for example, the
plaintiff lacked other legal protections for a misappropriated name or
symbol. The reason section 3369 was limited to use against secondary
name infringement is unknown. Finding precise reasons for the con-
finement of a California statute with apparently broad application to a
particular context is difficult because the state legislature's records do
not include legislative history. The language of the statute was broad
enough to cover many other then-existing varieties of unfair competi-
tion. As Dean Prosser has noted, unfair competition is a broad enough
tort to be the subject of numerous treatises.10 Also, there was nothing
about the particular variety of unfair competition described above that
required a statutory basis for legitimacy. Secondary name infringe-
ment had been recognized as a common-law tort in many jurisdictions
since at least the 1920's.11
The uncertain association between section 3369 and secondary
name infringement was illustrated by the early cases' confusing use of
precedent. Several important secondary name cases' 2 did not mention
section 3369. Later cases which did discuss section 3369 in the secon-
dary name infringement context cited the non-section 3369 cases as
precedent.' 3 Thus, the statutory and common-law bases for injunctive
8. See Athens Lodge No. 70 v. Wilson, 117 Cal. App. 2d 322, 255 P.2d 482 (1953).
See text accompanying notes 32-35 hfra.
9. See note 3 supra.
10. W. PRoSSER, LAW OF TORTS 956 (4th ed. 1971).
11. Id. at 959 nn. 57 & 58.
12. Johnston v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187 P.2d 474
(1947); Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal. 2d 685, 104 P.2d
650 (1940); Pohl v. Anderson, 13 Cal. App. 2d 241, 56 P.2d 992 (1936). See text accompany-
ing notes 17, 18-20, 30-31 infra.
13. MacSweeney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino, 235 Cal. App. 2d 549,45 Cal. Rptr. 546
(1965) (citing Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal. 2d 685, 104
P.2d 650 (1940)); People v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516
(1962) (citing Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal. 2d 685, 104
P.2d 650 (1940)); Winfield v. Charles, 77 Cal. App. 2d 64, 175 P.2d 69 (1946) (citing Pohl v.
Anderson, 13 Cal. App. 2d 241, 56 P.2d 992 (1936)); Wood v. Peffer, 55 Cal. App. 2d 116,
130 P.2d 220 (1942) (citing Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal.
2d 685, 104 P.2d 650 (1940); Pohl v. Anderson, 13 Cal. App. 2d 241, 56 P.2d 992 (1936)); cf
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relief from secondary name infringement merged in the case law. To
understand the development of the statute, therefore, one must ex-
amine the development of secondary name infringement law.
The earliest form of secondary name infringement developed in
the common-law tradition and was sharply limited by mechanical re-
quirements, presumably to facilitate legal predictability. A plaintiff oc-
casionally had the difficult task of proving elements such as actual
competition and actual fraudulent intent to succeed in a secondary
name infringement suit. 14 The first move away from this rigid view
occurred in 1935, when the California Supreme Court enunciated "the
right of the public to protection from fraud and deceit."' 15 The very
next year another case established a new test for deception. The court
held that it was sufficient to prove that "the public is likely to be
deceived" by the second use of the name.' 6 This test remains the pre-
vailing standard.' 7
The supreme court extended name-infringement protection to
noncompetitors in 1940, in Academy ofMotion Picture Arts and Sciences
v. Benson.'8 The Benson case, which did not mention section 3369,
involved a dispute over the defendant's use of the name "Hollywood
Motion Picture Academy" for her acting school. Although the plaintiff
was not in competition with defendant's school, the supreme court re-
versed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for an injunction,
stating: "[Ilt is sufficient if the unfair practices of the one will injure the
other."19 The breadth of this judicial expansion was emphasized by the
court's statement that the tort would include any conduct which "vio-
lates the fundamental rules of honesty and fair dealing. 20
Benson was the first step in the shift from the focus on harm to
competitors to the focus on harm to the public. In secondary name
58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 750 (citing the above cases in stating that the practice of using red
lights to disguise the true color of meat being offered for sale to the public violated § 3369).
14. See, e.g., American Auto. Ass'n v. American Auto. Owners Ass'n, 216 Cal. 125, 13
P.2d 707 (1932); Yellow Cab of San Diego v. Sachs, 191 Cal. 238, 216 P. 33 (1923); Duston
v. Los Angeles Van Co., 165 Cal. 89, 111 P. 115 (1913).
15. American Philatelic Soc'y v. Claibourne, 3 Cal. 2d 689, 698, 46 P.2d 135, 140
(1935). Claibourne has been cited for this dictum several times in § 3369 cases. See, eg.,
Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 110, 496 P.2d 817, 829, 101 Cal. Rptr.
745, 758 (1972); People v. Bestline Products, 61 Cal. App. 3d 879, 918, 132 Cal. Rptr; 767,
792 (1976). Interestingly, Claibourne is not a secondary name case, nor does it mention §
3369. Claibourne was one of a number of California cases concerned with unfair competi-
tion of "other" types, Ze., nonsecondary name infringement.
16. Pohl v. Anderson, 13 Cal. App. 2d 241, 242, 56 P.2d 992, 993 (1936) (emphasis
added).
17. Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971).
18. 15 Cal. 2d 685, 104 P.2d 650 (1940).
19. Id. at 689, 104 P.2d at 652.
20. Id. at 691, 104 P.2d at 653.
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infringement, a competitor is injured when the public becomes con-
fused as to whether the plaintiff or defendant is the rightful beneficiary
of the public's patronage.21 Thus, confusion is an element of the tort.
As the development of section 3369 continued, public confusion began
to be seen as the evil itself, regardless of the effect on competitors.
Two years after Benson, a court of appeal seized an opportunity to
expand the application of section 3369 in Wood v. Peffer22 by applying
the common-law rationale of Benson directly to a case requiring analy-
sis of section 3369 itself. Wood involved the unfair use of plaintiff's
decedent's name (Wood) by defendant in a radio advertisement. The
court's approach reflected the changing times by saying that the
"[e]mphasis should be placed on the word 'unfair' rather than 'competi-
tion'."23 It cited section 3369(3) as authority for abrogating the fraud
requirement.24 In so doing, the court noted that the statutory definition
of unfair competition was in disjunctive form-unfair or fraudulent
business practice.25 Although this analysis would be applauded by pro-
ponents of the expansion of name-infringement law, it was not required
by section 3369, as "unfair competition" is defined to include unfair or
fraudulent business practice. Section 3369 as written covered varieties
of unfair competition that are "unfair," as well as those that are "fraud-
ulent." The statute did not say that a particular type of unfair competi-
tion, such as secondary name infringement, was actionable by proof
that it harmed the plaintiff by being either unfair or fraudulent. The
judicial confusion is especially apparent because the Wood court cited
Benson as its primary authority although Benson does not even men-
tion section 3369. The result was that Benson used the common law to
develop the statutory meaning, while Wood used the statute to develop
the common law. This blurred process was to continue for the next ten
years, until section 3369 began to be uniformly cited as the basis for the
once purely common-law tort of secondary name infringement. The
confusion in development indicates that attorneys and judges were un-
sure as to how broad the statutory language was intended to be and
that the social incentive that would encourage lawyers to focus on sec-
tion 3369 itself as a remedy for a wide variety of unfair business prac-
tices did not yet exist.
The distinction between the statute as a basis for the tort of secon-
dary name infringement and as a general remedy for unfair business
practices was still sharply drawn in 1942 when Wood was decided.
21. Callman, Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 80, at 538 (3d
ed. 1969).
22. 55 Cal. App. 2d 116, 130 P.2d 220 (1942).
23. Id. at 122, 130 P.2d at 224.
24. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
25. 55 CaL App. 2d at 124, 130 P.2d at 225.
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Several months prior to the Wood court's expansion of the meaning of
secondary name infringement under section 3369, the supreme court
had narrowly construed the statute's potential for application to other
types of unfair practices in International Association of Cleaning and
Dye House Workers v. Landowitz.2 6 In Landowitz, union members had
attempted to use section 3369 as a basis for an injunction against viola-
tions of the San Francisco Cleaning and Dyeing Code. The code pro-
vided guides for competitive practices within the industry. The code's
injunction-enabling statute was repealed just prior to the suit, and
plaintiffs attempted to use section 3369 in its place. The court was
faced with a potential conflict between the prohibition against injunc-
tions to enforce a penal law in section 3369(1) and the broad definition
of unfair competition in section 3369(3). Only two years after it ex-
panded the common-law tort in Benson, the court chose to restrict the
application of section 3369 to its traditional uses:
Courts of equity, therefore, are loath to enjoin conduct on that
ground [unfair competition] in the absence of specific authorization
therefor .... Civil Code, section 3369, contains no broader a defini-
tion of the term "unfair competition" than existed at common law
and in itself furnishes no basis for an injunction against the violation
of the penal ordinance involved in this case.27
From the language of the statute, it seems that the court could have
decided that the public policy it had so recently enunciated in Benson
concerning the rights of the public to protection from fraud and deceit
in the area of secondary name infringement would shift the equities of
the case in favor of enjoining the unfair practices of the defendant. Its
opposite conclusion, especially by virtue of its unanimity, indicated
that the court was not ready to handle the burden of determining "un-
fairness" in a potentially unlimited number of business contexts. This
view would not change until much later with the advent of consumer-
ism as an accepted legal philosophy.28 In the early 1940's then, the
courts were expanding the use of section 3369 in the name-infringe-
ment context, while simultaneously restricting its use in the broad area
of unfair competition generally.
Decisions in the next decade followed the lead of Benson and
Landowitz by continuing to expand the name-infringement concept,
but they developed no other new uses of section 3369. In 1946, the
"likelihood of deception" test was first applied in a name-infringement
26. 20 Cal. 2d 418, 126 P.2d 609 (1942).
27. Id at 422, 126 P.2d at 611.
28. See Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 111 n.12, 101 Cal. Rptr.
745, 757, 496 P.2d 817, 829 (1972); see text accompanying notes 97-104 infra. See also Note,
Unfair Competition and the Consumer-Barquis v. Merchants Collection Association, Inc., 24
HAsTrNGs L. J. 537 (1973).
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case expressly decided under section 3369.29 The next year, in explicat-
ing the Benson rule of no "in-competition" requirement, a court of ap-
peal stated the prevailing philosophy succinctly:
The law is not quiescent. It progresses. Evolution of the law to meet
changing conditions is exemplified by the attitude of our Supreme
Court [in Benson] .... Modem conditions require our conclusion in
the instant case. The law is, and should be, molded to meet the
changing requirements of the people.30
This forward-sounding statement, however, applied only to the narrow
realm of secondary name infringement.31
By the 1950's, the statutory language had remained unchanged for
almost twenty years. The refusal of courts to accept, and of lawyers to
argue for, an interpretation consistent with the literal wording was a
strong sign of the social indifference to halting unfair. business prac-
tices. The slow and gradual broadening of the statute's application to
secondary name infringement continued, however, throughout the
fifties.
In 1953, a court was faced with the question of expanding the field
of parties who could stand as plaintiffs in a section 3369 action. As the
developing history has shown, the problem was not one of stretching
the meaning of words, but of supplying a judicial imprimatur to what
the statutory language "clearly" stated. In Athens Lodge No. 70 v.
Wilson,32 plaintiff, a fraternal lodge, contended that the phrase "other
organizations of persons"33 included plaintiff within the definition of
"person," and that the phrase "acting for the interests of itself, [or] its
members"34 gave it standing similar to class-action status. The court
agreed that the express language of the statute created an exception to
the general, common-law rule that an unincorporated association was
29. Winfield v. Charles, 77 Cal. App. 2d 64, 175 P.2d 69 (1946), applying the test stated
in Pohl v. Anderson, 13 CaL App. 2d 241, 56 P.2d 992 (1936).
30. Johnston v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 818, 187 P.2d 474,
487 (1947).
31. Even within this limited field, the judicial attitude of expansion was not uniform.
Two cases following Johnston in time (but not in law) reverted to the competition require-
ment, citing only F.T.C. cases as precedent: Scutt v. Bassett, 86 Cal. App. 2d 373, 194 P.2d
781 (1948); Weatherford v. Eytchison, 90 Cal. App. 2d 379, 202 P.2d 1040 (1949). Scutt
relied primarily on FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1930), which had interpreted FTC
Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), prior to the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendment. The Amendment
changed § 5 to include unfair or deceptive practices as within "unfair competition:' The
Scutt court chose to ignore the clear trend and returned to the older, strict rule. Despite its
position as an anomaly in the history of the tort, the Supreme Court of California denied a
hearing in the case, and its holding has never been expressly overruled. The same court of
appeal rejoined the prevailing trend three years later in McCord Co. v. Plotnick, 108 Cal.
App. 2d 392, 239 P.2d 32 (1951).
32. 117 Cal. App. 2d 322, 255 P.2d 482 (1953).
33. Former CAL. CiV. CODE § 3369(4).
34. Former CAL. Civ. CODE § 3369(5).
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not a "person," and held that the Lodge had standing under section
3369. 35 This ruling opened the courts to class actions against unfair
competition; however, since the statute was still limited to name-in-
.fringement suits, the decision's effect remained one of potential only.
Very few "classes" outside the particular type of plaintiff involved in
Athens Lodge would have grounds for complaint as to name infringe-
ment. Thus, until the basis for section 3369 liability was broadened, the
widened standing rule had no real effect.
The next step in the development of the name-infringement law
under section 3369 was a further shift away from the issue of injury to
the particular plaintiff and towards protection of the public in general.
In the 1954 case of Schwartz v. Slenderella Systems, Inc.,36 only the
dissent saw past the confines of secondary name infringement. Plaintiff
in Slenderella owned two retail women's apparel shops in Los Angeles.
Defendant corporation engaged in the business of operating weight-
reduction salons. Each party used the name "Slenderella" to designate
its particular facilities. While the majority affirmed the trial court's
finding of "no likelihood of confusion," 37 the dissent insisted that the
facts to which the parties stipulated showed confusion-in-fact, 38 stating:
"That the public may be educated to the point where they will not be
confused is no justification for refusing an injunction. '39
The dissent in Slenderella recognized the growing role of federal
and state courts as protectors of the public from the application of the
old rule of caveat emptor. Although limited to the name-infringement
context, the Slenderella dissent foreshadowed a trend toward courts
and other government legal personnel taking strong actions to guard
consumer rights. It is important to note that, for the most part, private
plaintiffs' attorneys were excluded from this trend, because they have
never become aware of the value of section 3369 as a tool in aid of
consumers. Private defense attorneys, also ignorant of the potential use
of 3369, are often quite surprised when their clients are sued for violat-
ing the statute's broad proscriptions.
The view that section 3369 was intended as a broader law than
that of name infringement first appeared in 1957 in Hesse v.
Grossman.4° Plaintiff Hesse charged Grossman with unfairly copying
Hesse's artistic method of creating religious mementoes. The court of
appeal affirmed plaintiffs right to sue. In what has turned out to be
surprisingly unused dictum, the court spoke of the broad definition of
35. 117 Cal. App. 2d at 324, 255 P.2d at 484.
36. 43 Cal. 2d 107, 271 P.2d 857 (1954).
37. Id. at 114, 271 P.2d at 861.
38. Id. at 115, 271 P.2d at 862.
39. Id. at 116, 271 P.2d at 862.
40. 152 Cal. App. 2d 536, 313 P.2d 625 (1957).
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unfair competition: "Grossman violated the rules of common honesty
and accepted business ethics as codified in the Civil Code, Section 3369,
subdivision 3.1"41 Although the case created no new law, Justice
Moore's bold generalization revealed the newly developing judicial at-
titude toward section 3369 that allowed the courts to begin applying
section 3369 in the manner that the language of the 1933 amendment
had long permitted.
The National Research Case and the Advent of Consumer
Fraud Prosecution
By the late 1950's, consumer protection had begun to take shape as
a body of law. In 1959, the California Attorney General's Office
opened its Consumer Fraud Unit, which was patterned after the New
York State Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protections founded ear-
lier the same year.42 The opening of these bureaus was only the first
step. No special legislation accompanied the opening of the fraud bu-
reaus, for as the chief of the New York Bureau stated, "We might still
not be started if we had to wait for an enabling statute." 43 Ralph Na-
der had not yet begun to counteract the business lobby, and the boom
in federal consumer legislation was still several years away.44 The at-
torneys in these offices were faced with the task of using laws that were
not necessarily designed to protect consumers against modern fraud
schemes, while realizing that new legislation was not then a viable
alternative.45
The consumer protection movement was further advanced by
President Kennedy in his message to Congress of March 15, 1962.46
For the first time, the specific goals and rights of consumers were enun-
ciated by a powerful, national voice. President Kennedy stated that
one of the four "basic consumer rights," the right to be informed, con-
sisted in part of the right "to be informed... against fraudulent, de-
ceitful, or grossly misleading information, advertising, labelling, or
other practices, and to be given the facts [the consumer] needs to make
an informed choice."47 This statement gave strong support to those
41. Id at 540, 313 P.2d at 627 (emphasis added).
42. Telephone interview with Mr. Howard Jewel, former Deputy Attorney General of
California (Feb. 1978). By statute, California also established the Consumer Council as a
legislative advisor only. The agency was disbanded by statute in 1970, and its duties were
assumed by the Department of Consumer Affairs. Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 1394, § 1, at 2622.
43. Statement of Barnett Levy, quotedin Comment, Translating Sympathyfor Deceived
Consumers into Effective Programsfor Protection, 114 U. PA. L. Rlv. 395, 433 (1966).
44. Cf. id at 411-12 (recounting history of consumer credit fraud in Pennsylvania).
45. Id. at 411.
46. 108 CoNG. R~c. 4167 (1962).
47. Id. at 4168.
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state attorneys and judges who also saw the need to create in the mar-
ketplace an honest and straightforward relationship between buyer and
seller.
Those attorneys general who attempted to strengthen their hands
via new legislation saw the injunction as the perfect tool.48 The injunc-
tion combined a relatively easy proof requirement with an effective
remedy. Criminal statutes requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt
as well as often requiring proof of actual fraudulent intent were re-
jected as a means of aiding consumer fraud offices because these strin-
gent standards were too difficult to meet in the context of unfair
competition. Because injunctions invoked the equitable powers of the
court, they could be used to obtain restitution for victims of fraud.4 9
Injunctive relief would also put a permanent halt to the illegal practices
of a particular business, rather than imposing a temporary remedy of
fine or imprisonment.50 Although some states had to struggle to pass
such injunction statutes,5' California had a ready-made law in Civil
Code section 3369.
From its inception in 1959 the California Attorney General's Con-
sumer Fraud Unit began using section 3369.52 Three years later, an
appellate court had the opportunity to review the new application of
the twenty-nine-year-old amended statute 53 in People v. National Re-
search Co.54 National Research involved the manufacture and distri-
bution by defendants of forms known as "skip tracers." The forms
simulated State of California documents commonly distributed by the
Department of Motor Vehicles and the Department of Employment. 55
Defendants sold these forms to collection agencies, who used them to
lure unsuspecting debtors into providing information regarding their
whereabouts and financial status so as to facilitate collection of out-
standing debts.56 The trial court found that defendants' acts violated
48. Comment, Translating Sympathyfor Deceived Consumers into Effective Programsfor
Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 427 (1966).
49. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 121 1/2, § 267 (Smith-Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1978).
50. Comment, Translating Sympathyfor Deceived Consumers into Effective Programsfor
Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 428 (1966).
51. E.g., Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 121 1/2, § 267 (Smith-Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-8 (West 1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.79 (West 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-
15-07 (1965); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1972).
52. Telephone interview with Mr. Michael Traynor, former Deputy Attorney General
of California (and trial counsel on the National Research case, note 4 supra) (Feb. 1978).
53. State and federal prosecutions of civil-fraud cases rarely reach the appellate level
because of the advantages to both sides of consent decree settlements. The "make or break"
nature of the National Research appeal as to the future application of § 3369 was likely in
the minds of attorneys for both sides. See text accompanying note 54-79 infra.
54. 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
55. Id. at 768, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
56. Id
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section 3369 and granted plaintiff a broad injunction.5 7
On appeal, the Attorney General presented two distinct bases for
the application of section 3369 to defendants' conduct. First, plaintiff
contended that the case fit within the traditional, name-infringement
context with the State of California and its agencies as the infringed-
upon names.5 8 In so doing, plaintiff cited the cases discussed above,59
seeking not to expand the developed common law but simply to sup-
port the trial court's finding of a violation of section 3369.
Second, plaintiff seized the opportunity to break section 3369 out
of its name-infringement shell. Plaintiff drew the previously unused
but forceful analogy between section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act6° and section 3369.61 In 1930, the United States Supreme
Court, in FTC v. Raladam Co.,62 had insisted that section 5(a), as then
written,63 required proof of actual harm to competition. Although
Congress did not act to expand section 5(a) until 1938, 64 the California
legislature amended section 3369 in 1933, in apparent response to the
Raladam decision. As plaintiff stated, "It would appear that the pur-
pose of this amendment was the same as that of the Wheeler-Lea
amendment to section 5 of the FTC Act."'65
Although the language of the two amendments is very similar, the
fact that in nearly thirty years of interpretation the analogy had not
been drawn seems to militate against such an inference of similar pur-
pose. Further, one would not presume that, as in other contexts, the
state was following the federal lead, because the section 3369 amend-
ment came five years prior to the section 5 amendment. Nevertheless,
the court of appeal unanimously agreed that the analogy was appropri-
ate, stating that "[i]n view of the similarity of language and obvious
identity of purpose of the two statutes, decisions of the federal court on
the subject are more than ordinarily persuasive. '66
57. Id at 769, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
58. Brief for Respondent at 12.
59. Plaintiff cited Winfield v. Charles, 77 Cal. App. 2d 64, 175 P.2d 69 (1946), dis-
cussed in text accompanying note 29 supra; Schwartz v. Slenderella Systems, 43 Cal. 2d 107,
271 P.2d 857 (1954), discussed in text accompanying notes 36-39 supra; Academy of Motion
Picture Arts and Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal. 2d 685, 104 P.2d 650 (1940), discussed in text
accompanying notes 18-20 supra; and Athens Lodge No. 70 v. Wilson, 117 Cal. App. 2d 322,
255 P.2d 482 (1953), discussed in text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976).
61. See text accompanying notes 4-8 supra.
62. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
63. "Unfair methods of competition in commerce are declared unlawful." Id. at 651;
cf. note 6 supra.
64. The Wheeler-Lea Amendment added "and unfair or deceptive acts or practices"
after "competition." Act of Mar. 21, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3, 52 Stats. 111.
65. Brief for Respondent at 15 (emphasis added).
66. 201 Cal. App. 2d at 773, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 522. As noted earlier, there is no official
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With this single statement, the court opened up section 3369 for
possible application in every type of situation in which section 5 could
potentially be used. The analogy was especially appropriate in the Na-
tional Research case because the FTC previously had obtained section
5 injunctions against the practice of decoy skip-tracing generally, and
specifically against these same defendants. 67 To further illustrate its
willingness to go along with plaintiffs urged expansion of section
3369's application, the court cited the Restatement of Torts as authority
for the trend towards "enforcing increasingly higher standards of fair-
ness or commercial morality in trade."68 The court quoted Calfornia
Jurisprudence69 for the proposition that "the current trend is to redefine
the action as one against unfair business practices, rather than unfair
competition. '70 Although it does mention the case authority that, as
discussed above, developed name-infringement law, the court cites no
cases which illustrate the trend noted by the Restatement and by Cali-
fornia Jurisprudence. The primary reason the court cited no cases is
that there were no California cases.
Given this attitude of liberal interpretation and application, it is
not surprising that the court rejected defendants' constitutional vague-
ness challenge. It defined the test for vagueness as follows: "A statute
designed to protect the public good must be upheld unless its nullity
clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears."' 71 By pronouncing such
a strict test, the court made a vagueness challenge virtually impossible.
The court went on to say, however, that "[tihere is thus a definite back-
ground of experience and precedence to illuminate the meaning of the
words employed in the statute. No one need reasonably be misled
thereby. '72 This statement was true enough as to name-infringement
California legislative history. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra. Thus, there was no
way to prove the truth or falsity of plaintiffs analogy to the FTC Act.
67. See Mohr v. FTC, 272 F.2d 401 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 920 (1959) (same
defendants as in NationalResearch); Bennett v. FTC, 200 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Roths-
child v. FTC, 200 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1952); Bernstein v. FTC, 200 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1952);
DeJay Stores v. FTC, 200 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1952). The court cited the above cases as sup-
port. 201 Cal. App. 2d at 773, 778, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 522, 525.
68. 201 Cal. App. 2d at 770, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 520 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS,
Introductory Note to ch. 35, at 540 (1938)).
69. See Brief for Respondent at 12.
70. 201 Cal. App. 2d at 771, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 520 (citing 47 CAL. JUR. 2d, Trademarks,
Tradenames, and Trade Practices § 25). This section cites only Winfield v. Charles, 77 Cal.
App. 2d 64, 175 P.2d 69 (1946), as support for the "trend."
71. 201 Cal. App. 2d at 772, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 521, (quoting Lawton v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 143 Cal. App. 2d 256, 261, 299 P.2d 362, 366 (1956)). Lawton dealt with a "dep-
rivation of property without due process" challenge to CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2142,
which forbids the unauthorized use of the word "doctor" or letters "M.D." The analogy
may be a bit farfetched, but it was clear that the court was not about to invalidate § 3369 for
any reason, so the source of the language for its constitutional test is not of great importance.
72. 201 Cal. App. 2d at 772, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
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cases, but the implication that history would have given defendants fair
notice that its conduct would be condemned as "unfair business prac-
tice" was weak. Because National Research was the first case to expand
section 3369 to its "intended" application, there was no "background of
experience and precedence" upon which defendants could have relied
for notice purposes.
Fortunately, the court presented a second rationale upon which to
uphold the statute, saying that "it would be impossible to draft in ad-
vance detailed plans and specifications of all acts and conduct to be
prohibited ... ,since unfair or fraudulent business practices may run
the gamut of human ingenuity and chicanery."'73 This notion was in
line with the reasonably inferable intent of the legislature, and was ac-
ceptable in light of the direction that section 3369 would now take. Un-
fairness had become a question of fact,74 and given that FTC precedent
now would also serve as a guide, future defendants would truly have
constitutional notice of possible violations of section 3369.
The final ruling in National Research was on defendants' chal-
lenge to the scope of the injunction issued by the trial court which en-
joined defendants from "processing, selling or otherwise handling"'75
the proscribed forms "in California or elsewhere."'76 The court noted
that "defendants displayed great ingenuity and resourcefulness" 77 in
diversifying their scheme among mailing points in and out of Califor-
nia. To limit defendants' "protean proclivity"'87 and because all that
was necessary to invoke the wide scope of equity was personal jurisdic-
tion over defendants, the broad injunction was upheld.7 9 This holding
further strengthened the power of section 3369 as a multipurpose, con-
sumer protection weapon. Without such a holding, defendants clever
enough to create elaborate fraud schemes could easily circumvent lim-
ited injunctions by altering their rackets according to need.
National Research was a perfect case on which to base the transi-
tion of section 3369. The nature of defendants' conduct as both a sec-
ondary name infringement and an unfair business practice allowed the
court to expand section 3369 without applying the statute to wholly
different behavior than that enjoined in prior cases. The opinion an-
swered many questions, but inevitably also opened up a new range of
potential problems regarding the limits of the newly interpreted statute.
As will be seen, these problems have yet to be fully resolved.
73. Id. This idea goes back at least to Pahl v. Anderson, 13 Cal. App. 2d 241, 242, 56
P.2d 992, 993 (1936). See also note 12 supra.
74. 201 Cal. App. 2d at 772, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
75. Id. at 774, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
76. Id at 776, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
77. Id at 775, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
78. Id at 775, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
79. Id at 776, 20 CaL Rptr. at 523.
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After National Research and into the Future
Despite its broad rulings, National Research did not change the
use of section 3369 overnight. As noted earlier,80 consumer fraud cases
rarely reach the appellate level. As a result several years passed before
any new cases gave the courts the opportunity to interpret National
Research. This lack of published interpretation limited public knowl-
edge of the statute, because without published opinions, attorneys
outside of the public enforcement field would have little chance to
learn of the existence and scope of application of section 3369. This
problem continues to the present day and is a primary factor in the lack
of understanding by attorneys of the historical interpretation that the
statute has undergone before and after National Research.8'
The next nine cases after National Research dealing with section
3369 were either traditional name-infringement cases or property-for-
feiture cases.82 The legislature reacted to National Research in 1963 by
amending the statute to add "unlawful" business practice to the defini-
tion of unfair competition in section 3369(3),3 and changed the refer-
ence to false advertising from Penal Code sections 654(a), (b), and (c)
to Business and Professions Code sections 17500-17535.8 4 Although
the latter alteration was primarily procedural, the addition of "unlaw-
ful" has proved to be of great significance.85
The connection between section 3369 and false advertising had ex-
isted since the 1933 amendment, but no reported case associated the
two until 1967.86 This use is of primary importance to public prosecu-
tors, because false advertising is the single-most common complaint
handled by consumer fraud units.87 Although the scope of Business
80. See note 53 supra.
81. The author's experience as a clerk in the Alameda County District Attorney's Con-
sumer Fraud Unit revealed that many judges and attorneys outside of the Unit and other
public enforcement offices are completely unaware of § 3369 and its history of less-than-
literal interpretation.
82. See, e.g., MacSweeney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino, 235 Cal. App. 2d 549,45 Cal.
Rptr. 546 (1965); Visser v. Macres, 214 Cal. App. 2d 249, 29 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1963). Name-
infringement law was modified further during the 1960's in connection with § 3369, but in
light of National Research and its progeny, these modifications will not be discussed further.
The current state of the law in this regard can be seen in Ball v. American Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 14 Cal. App. 3d 289, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1971).
83. Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 1606, § 1, at 3184.
84. In 1941, various sections of the Penal Code relating to false advertising were re-
pealed and replaced by new sections in the Business and Professions Code. See CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 30041 (West 1964); Cal. Stat. 1941, ch. 63, §§ 1-2, at 727-29. The change did
not affect the substantive provisions of § 3369.
85. See, e.g., 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 750, 751; see text accompanying notes 90, 97-108
ifra.
86. People v. Lynam, 253 Cal. App. 2d 959, 61 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1967).
87. Letter from Mr. Richard Kalustian, Chief Deputy District Attorney of Los Angeles
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and Professions Code sections 17500-17535 has been litigated on nu-
merous occasions,88 its association with Civil Code section 3369 has
never been challenged. From the express language of section 3369(3),
one might feel that this association is obvious. As is apparent from the
previous discussion, however, no interpretation of section 3369 is
"obvious." 8 9
Private and public cases after National Research that attempted to
apply section 3369 to nonadvertising unfair competition situations are
more interesting from the standpoint of judicial interpretation. In
1970, a group of migrant farmworkers filed a class action under section
3369 against owners of several ranches for an injunction against the
practice of hiring illegal aliens in Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch.90 The court
of appeal discussed problems involving illegal alien labor at length,
emphasizing the failure of the federal government to fulfill its statutory
duties under the Immigration and Naturalization Act.91 The court re-
fused to grant the injunction, not on the grounds that section 3369 did
not apply, but because the court found that it would be "more orderly,
more effectual, less burdensome to the affected interests, that the na-
tional government redeem its commitment. '92 The court implied that
section 3369 may have properly applied had the federal government
not, in effect, preempted the field.93
The Diaz opinion is a good example of the new willingness of the
County's Consumer Fraud & Environment Protection Division (March 1978); interview
with Mr. John Porter, Deputy Attorney General of California, Consumer Fraud Unit
(March 1978). The author's experience as a law clerk at the Alameda County District Attor-
ney's Consumer Fraud Division also bears out this fact.
88. See eg., People v. Superior Court (Jayhill), 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 192 (1973); People v. Witzerman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1972); see
text accompanying notes 111-18 infra.
89. See text accompanying notes 26-28, 32-35 supra.
90. 9 Cal. App. 3d 588, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1970). The Diaz suit was apparently inspired
by a Note in The Hastings Law Journal in 1968. The Note argued forcefully that unlawful
working conditions constituted an "unlawful business practice" within § 3369(3) in light of
the trend toward liberal interpretation after National Research. See Note, UnlawfulAgricul-
tural Working Conditions as Nuisance or Unfair Competition, 19 HASTINGS L. J. 398 (1968).
The Note argued further that a "public deceit" element would possibly be required,
which it found in the public's reliance on receiving agricultural products produced under
lawful working conditions. This, however, is inconsistent with the Note's argument that
"unfair competition" now included "anything that can properly be called a business practice
and that at the same time is forbidden by law." Id. at 408-11, cited in Barquis v. Merchants
Collection Ass'n of Oakland, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 113, 496 P.2d 817, 830, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745, 758
(1972); 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 750,751. Many business practices which may be unlawful do
not involve public deceit (eg.. Sunday closing laws, selling illegal goods, such as drugs or
whalemeat). See People v. K. Sakai Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 531, 128 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1976).
91. 9 Cal. App. 3d 588, 592-99, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 445-50 (1970).
92. Id at 599, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
93. Id at 591, 88 CaL Rptr. at 444.
January 1979]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
courts to use section 3369 in situations far removed from the secondary
name tradition. National Research was not the sole cause of this new
attitude. In the 1960's, much consumer legislation, such as the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act94 and the Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act,95 had been passed under President Johnson's Great Society pro-
gram and the influence of Ralph Nader. The enthusiasm for protective
consumer legislation spread to state governments, including Califor-
nia's, which added many protective statutes in the 1960's.96 Judicial
liberality in interpreting section 3369 followed naturally in light of the
new legislation.
One open question remaining after National Research, however,
was the reaction of the California Supreme Court to a "new" section
3369 situation. The 1972 case of Barquis v. Merchants Collection Asso-
ciation of Oakland97 resolved doubts that remained in the minds of
consumer advocates and quashed any hope that remained in the minds
of business people that section 3369 would remain a narrow remedy.
The case was a class action by debtors who alleged that defendant col-
lection agency had engaged in the practice of deliberately filing actions
in courts of improper venue in order to obtain default judgments.98
Defendant, hoping that the supreme court would restrict the holding of
NationalResearch, argued that the statute required injury to a competi-
tor, and, in any event, was limited to common-law unfair competition
as typified by the old, name-infringement cases.99 The court swept
these contentions aside in a broadly worded opinion that left few
boundaries to the use of section 3369. In reaffirnming National
Research's analogy between the 1933 amendment and the 1938
Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the FTC Act, °° the court said: "Section
3369's parallel broad proscription of 'unlawful (or) unfair. . . business
practice(s)' illustrates no less a concern for wronged consumers [than
the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendment]." 101 The unanimous opinion went
on to interpret the statutory wording for its facial meaning, something
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1681s (1968).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1451-1461 (1966). President Johnson also acted by reiterating the sub-
stance of President Kennedy's 1962 message to Congress regarding consumers' rights, see
text accompanying notes 46-47 supra, in his own Congressional message in 1964. 110 CONG.
Rac. 1958 (1964).
96. E.g., Health Studio Services Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1812.80-1812.95 (West 1973)
(added by Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1675, § 1, at 3641); Dance Studio Act, CAL. CIv. CODE §§
1812.50-1812.68 (West 1973 & Supp. 1978) (added by Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1571, § 1, at 3190).
97. 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972). See generally Note, Unfair
Competition and the Consuwer-Barquis v. Merchants Collection Association, Inc., 24 HAs-
TiNGs L. J. 537 (1973).
98. 7 Cal. 3d at 100, 596 P.2d at 821, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
99. Id. at 109, 496 P.2d at 828, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
100. See text accompanying notes 60-67 supra.
101. 7 Cal. 3d at 109-10, 496 P.2d at 828, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
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which few courts had done in the forty years since the amendment:
"The language of section 3369... explicitly extends to any 'unlawful,
unfair or (deceptive) business practice'; the Legislature, in our view,
intended by this sweeping language to permit tribunals to enjoin ongo-
ing wrongful business conduct in whatever context such activity might
occur."10 2 The court limited the early, narrow interpretation in
Landowitz10 3 to its facts and historical circumstances, leaving no basis
in precedent upon which to build an argument limiting section 3369.104
It also favorably discussed the treatment of section 3369 in the Diaz
case, 10 5 indicating its support for imaginative uses of the statute.
The Barquis case eliminated the final vestiges of the old section
3369 format. It brought the statute firmly in line with the judicial atti-
tude which was changing the maxim "caveat emptor" into "caveat ven-
dor." The court's language was so clear and forceful as to make
challenge nearly futile. Armed with Barquis, the few consumer attor-
neys who were aware of the new developments, along with public pros-
ecutors, launched a far-reaching campaign aimed at getting the full use
of section 3369's newly released potential.
The legislature cooperated in this effort by adding Civil Code sec-
tion 3370.1 in 1972 as a civil-penalty adjunct to section 3369.106 It also
added section 3370.2 as a penalty for intentional violations of injunc-
tions issued pursuant to section 3369.107 Violators were now faced not
only with an injunction, but with substantial economic losses. One re-
sult of this strengthening was an increase in the number of suits settled
by stipulation. 10  Another result was a boom in the opening of district
attorney's consumer fraud divisions. 109 Monetary awards under section
3370.1 were limited to public suits, so there was no opportunity for
attorney-fee penalties in private suits such as Barquis, but district attor-
ney consumer fraud divisions could now be at least partially self-
102. Id. at 111, 496 P.2d at 829, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 757 (footnote omitted).
103. International Ass'n of Cleaning and Dye House Workers v. Landowitz, 20 Cal. 2d
418, 126 P.2d 609 (1942); see text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
104. 7 Cal. 3d at 11.1 n.12, 496 P.2d at 830, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
105. See note 90 & accompanying text supra.
106. Added by Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1084, § 2, at 2021 (current version at CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 17206 (West Supp. 1978)). Section 3370.1 read, in pertinent part: "Any per-
son who violates any provision of this chapter [§§ 3366-3370.2] shall be liable for a civil
penalty not to exceed... ($2,500) for each violation." The legislature also added the word
"deceptive" to section 3369(3) in reference to advertising. Cal. Stat. 1972., ch. 1084, § 1, at
2020.
107. Cal. Stat. 1976, ch. 1006, § 1, at 2379. (current version at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 17207 (West Supp. 1978)).
108. See generally Project, The Direct Selling Industiry. An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 890, 963 (1969).
109. Of the eight divisions responding to a questionnaire by the author, five (Santa
Clara, Riverside, Butte, Orange, and San Joaquin counties) were founded in 1972 or later.
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supporting. "0
Section 3370.1 presented one major problem in interpretation that
was temporarily resolved in the case of People v. Superior Court
(layhill)"' the year after section 3370.1 was passed. The statute al-
lowed up to $2500.00 in penalties per violation, without defining what
constituted a "violation." Interpreting the parallel provision of the
Business and Professions Code, section 17536,112 the court defined a
single violation as being each identifiable victim of the misrepresenta-
tion, rather than the number of misrepresentations themselves.1 3 The
application of this definition to a nonadvertising case under section
3369 is unclear.
The court's rationale in Jayhill was that the legislature intended to
limit the penalty to a reasonable figure; it reasoned that since a particu-
lar advertisement might contain numerous misrepresentations, a differ-
ent ruling could result in enormous penalties for a single false ad.' 4 At
least one commentator has criticized this holding for its failure to per-
ceive the logical result of the violation-victim rule, pointing out that a
newspaper ad of wide circulation could result in literally millions of
victims.1 5 Even if the ruling were consistent as to advertising, it could
not be applied readily to section 3369 cases where the public at large is
the victim, rather than identifiable individuals. To date no court has
clarified the rule as to section 3369. Jayhill leaves trial courts and pros-
ecutors with great discretion in determining the penalties in a particular
case.
Another important aspect of Jayhill was its approval of other
forms of equitable relief once equitable jurisdiction is found under sec-
tion 17535.'16 The court allowed the Attorney General to collect resti-
110. Section 3370.1 provided that penalties collected in suits instituted by a district attor-
ney accrue to that county, while one-half of attorney general suits' penalties are distributed
to the county in which the case was filed.
111. 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P. 2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973).
112. Section 17536 gave identical penalty remedies for violation of § 17500, the false
advertising law which is incorporated into § 3369(3). However, § 17536 was first enacted in
1965, Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 827, § I at 2419, while § 3370.1 was not enacted until after the
Jayhill suit had been filed. Thus, the interpretation of § 17536 applied equally to § 3370.1.
See 9 Cal. 3d at 287 n.2, 507 P.2d at 1403, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
113. 9 Cal. 3d at 289, 507 P.2d at 1404, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
114. Id at 289, 507 P. 2d at 1403, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
115. J. MCCALL, CONSUMER PROTECTION: CASES, NOTES, AND MATERIALS 367 (1977).
116. Section 17535 provides for injunctions for violations of § 17500. Its wording is
substantially similar to the provisions of § 3369 regarding attorney general or district attor-
ney equitable jurisdiction. The section was amended in 1972 after the filing of the fayhill
suit, but prior to the supreme court opinion, to expressly provide for "orders or judgments
...which may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real
or personal, which may have been acquired by means of any practice in this chapter de-
clared to be unlawful." Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 244, § 1, at 491.
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tution from the defendant for all property and money received as a
result of the fraudulent scheme. 117 Although the court did not ex-
pressly extend this restitution rule to section 3369, later courts have
done so, citing Jayhill as authority.118 This result is in line with the
trend after National Research, and certainly after Barquis. Section
3369, however, speaks specifically of injunction only. Any other relief
granted by the court must be by virtue of the court's inherent equitable
powers, not by virtue of the language of the statute.
After Barquis and Jayhill, section 3369 was firmly established as
an umbrella statute covering nearly every imaginable factual situation
involving illegal or unfair business activity. Nearly thirty years had
passed before the statute broke out of its name-infringement-fraud
shell. Having now emerged, section 3369 has been applied in an almost
incredible variety of situations.119 The acceptance of the new format
has been so complete that most of the post-ayhill appellate decisions
which mention section 3369 deal with issues other than the propriety of
the particular statutory application. 120
A few of the more unusual cases filed in the last few years illus-
trate the wide scope that section 3369 has attained. In Los Angeles, the
district attorney sued the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Ani-
mals for alleged inhumane treatment and business practices that were
unfair to the sheltered animals.' 2' That office also sued a medical
clinic that was so negligent in conducting pregnancy tests that eighteen
out of twenty-two results were incorrect.122 In neither case was the sec-
tion 3369 claim successfully challenged before trial.
The Riverside County District Attorney's office has been the most
innovative. Its section 3369 cases include a claim against a massage
117. 9 Cal. 3d of 286, 507 P.2d at 1403, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
118. See United Farm Workers of America v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 334,344-
45, 120 Cal. Rptr. 904, 911 (1975).
119. Many of the following cases were supplied to the author by various district attorney
consumer fraud divisions throughout the state. Because very few of these cases ever get to
trial (eg., in the nine-year history of the Alameda County District Attorney-Consumer
Fraud Unit, only one case out of hundreds filed has gone to trial), even fewer are reported.
Therefore, the unreported recent or pending cases represent the best source of imaginative
uses of § 3369.
120. See, ag., Skinner v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. App. 3d 183, 137 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1977)
(search and seizure); People v. K. Sakai Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 531, 128 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1976)
(constitutionality of underlying whalemeat sale prohibition statute); People v. Superior
Court (Kaufman), 12 Cal. 3d 421, 525 P.2d 716, 115 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974) (discovery and
self-incrimination).
121. People v. S.P.C.A., No. C222785 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct., filed Dec. 8,
1977) (awaiting trial as of this writing).
122. People v. Phoenix Family Medical Clinic, No. C167735 (Los Angeles County
Super. CL, filed July 20, 1976) (settled pursuant to consent decree).
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parlor for engaging in acts of prostitution,123 an automobile wholesaler
involved in similar sexual activities associated with the delivery of cars
to retailers,' 24and against a railroad for violating antipollution laws.125
Only the last claim was challenged successfully; an appeal was not
taken for tactical reasons. It should be apparent, however, that there is
no legal reason that section 3369 would not apply to prevent the unlaw-
ful business practice of persistent, illegal air pollution.
The Alameda County District Attorney's office has been working
on a case that truly marks an extension of the statute into a broad field
of potential liability. The case, People v. Earl Seheib, Inc.'26 alleged
that various labor practices such as falsifying time cards, failing to
comply with a state wage order, and certain statutory violations of the
Labor Code violated section 3369. Although the demurrer to the first
amended complaint was sustained on the basis of no allegation of in-
jury to the People of the State of California, 127 the demurrer to a sub-
stantially similar second amended complaint was overruled. The
simplified pleading rule established by Jayhill 28 allowed the district
attorney to allege violations by Scheib committed by many of its for-
mer paint-shop managers without detailing the particulars. The case
threatens defendant with civil penalties in excess of $1,000,000.
The Scheib case points the way for powerful civil prosecution of a
variety of labor practices that had previously been limited to possible
misdemeanor criminal penalties.
Almost all 9f the district attorneys' offices have used section 3369
in health and safety cases, such as "bugs-in-the-booze" and unsanitary
manufacturing situations. 2 9 The provisions of the state food and drug
laws are thus boosted by the injunctive and penalty remedies of sec-
tions 3369 and 3370.1.
Very recently, a Riverside County "new wave" section 3369 law-
suit was reviewed by the California court of appeal. The case, People v.
123. People v. Villa Roma Spa, No. Indio 21266 (Riverside County Super. Ct., filed
April 9, 1976) (settled pursuant to consent decree).
124. People v. Cobulsar, No. Riverside 121110 (Riverside County Super. Ct., filed July
18, 1977) (case pending as of this writing after defendant's demurrer was overruled).
125. People v. Southern Pacific R., No. Riverside 117142 (Riverside County Super. Ct.,
filed Aug. 30, 1976) (defendant's demurrer sustained).
126. Civil No. 472040-7 (Alameda County Super. Ct., filed Nov. 10, 1975).
127. Hearing on April 25, 1978.
128. Jayhill allowed the plaintiff to allege general facts as to the nature of the violation
without pleading names of victims, perpetrators, dates or places. People v. Superior Court
(Jayhill), 9 Cal. 3d at 288, 507 P.2d at 1403, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
129. Cases based on the California Sherman Pure Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 26000-26851 (West Supp. 1978), and other similar provisions of
the Health and Safety Code were mentioned by almost every district attorney's office an-
swering the author's questionnaire.
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McKale,1 30 determined the sufficiency of a fifty-nine-count complaint,
the core of which alleged ani-Semitic practices by the owner of a mo-
bile home park, as an unlawful business practice under section 3369.131
The court reviewed the developments under Barquis132 and Jayhill,1 33
but cited no other significant cases interpreting section 3369. The court
treated section 3369 as if it had just recently been enacted: "Concurrent
with increased involvement by the district attorney with consumer pro-
tection is the broadened definition of unfair competition. Business and
Professions Code section 17200 defines unfair competition as including
'unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice . ,"'34 However,
the court recognized the command of Barquis to liberally construe the
statute, and held that the district attorney had properly stated a cause
of action, since "any conduct forbidden by law practiced as a pattern
by a business establishment."1 35
An area not yet litigated under section 3369 is that of credit protec-
tion. Violations of the federal Truth-in-Lending Act136 or the state Un-
ruh and Rees-Levering Acts137 would qualify as unlawful business
practices within the statute and would create a public-enforcement
weapon with which to protect consumers. Section 3369(3) does not
limit "unlawful" to unlawful under state law. The rationale behind the
broad scope of the statute's coverage appears to include the prohibition
in California of conduct proscribed by Congress, as well as conduct
proscribed by the state legislature. Such an approach would allow state
prosecutors and private consumer attorneys to enhance the enforce-
ment of federal consumer statutes in suits that might be "too small" for
the limited budget of federal agencies, such as the FTC or Department
of Justice.
Conclusion
Section 3369 has progressed from a narrowly limited statute into a
powerful, consumer protection weapon. The ongoing national concern
with the rights of consumers throughout the late 1950's and early 1960's
was reflected in the National Research case in 1962, as section 3369
developed from the protection of competitors through private, name-
130. 83 CaL App. 3d 623, 48 CaL Rptr. 181 (1978).
131. The opinion notes that the complaint, as originally ified, alleged § 3369 as the basis
for standing, but that legislative changes made it prefererable to word the opinion in terms
of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200-17208 (West Supp. 1978). See note 138 & accompany-
ing text infra.
132. See text accompanying notes 97-105 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 111-16 supra.
134. 83 Cal. App. 3d at 630, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
135. Id
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681s (1968).
137. CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1801-1812.10, 2981-2984.4 (West 1974).
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infringement suits to use by public prosecutors promoting consumer
welfare. The California judiciary has greatly aided this development
by sweeping away the strict, common-law restrictions which prevailed
during the 1940's and 1950's. The courts have substituted broad, policy
guidelines that leave much to the imagination of attorneys. Such imag-
ination is manifested by the expanding awareness of the public of its
rights to be free from unfair or deceptive business practices.
One current factor that threatens to slow the progress of consumer
welfare in California is the passage of tax-revolt measure Proposition
13. Since district attorneys are generally funded by county property
taxes, many offices are likely to find consumer fraud division funds
taking a back seat to the expenses of general criminal prosecution.
Once the dollar limits are placed on a district attorney's operation, the
distribution of those dollars is determined by what the district attorney
feels are the needs of the locality. It will be up to the public to express
its concern for the continued priority of consumer protection, as effec-
tuated on the local level through section 3369 lawsuits. Local political
groups have great potential power to affect the nature of prosecution,
especially in light of the fact that the district attorney is an elected of-
ficer. The financial costs required to prevent abuses in the marketplace
are a small price to pay in exchange for the maintenance of fair deal-
ings between business persons and consumers.
However, the main stumbling block to everyday use of section
3369 byprivate attorneys is the continued lack of information about its
availability in a wide variety of fact situations. Also, the limited finan-
cial resources of public prosecutors, especially in light of Proposition
13, would be stretched by the enforcement of section 3369 through pri-
vately funded lawsuits. The interpretation by the California judiciary
has reached as far as the statutory language can go; it is now up to
attorneys to increase the incidence of section 3369 actions when neces-
sary to protect the public from unscrupulous business practices.
In 1977, section 3369 was replaced by a virtually identical set of
provisions at sections 17200-17205 of the Business and Professions
Code. 138 This clerical change completed the transition of the statute
into a consumer protection law by joining it with the Cartwright Act
(antitrust),139 the Unfair Practices Act, 14 0 and the various false advertis-
ing provisions contained in Business and Professions Code sections
17000-17568.141 The history of section 3369 proves that the law is a
living, changing phenomenon, molded by political considerations of a
particular social period. It also shows the great power that rests in ap-
138. Cal. Stat. 1977, ch. 298, § 1, at 877.
139. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-16804 (West 1964).
140. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 1964).
141. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17568 (West 1964).
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pellate and trial court judges to push the law forward to meet the needs
of the times or freeze it in its historical tradition regardless of those
needs. Finally, it is a reminder to all lawyers that statutory words have
many meanings, and the most "plain" of those meanings is often the
most difficult of which to convince a court.

